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Heterogeneous Information and Investment under Uncertainty 
 
1. Introduction  
In the famous ‘option value of waiting under uncertainty’ investment models of 
McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit (1989), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), investors have perfect 
information on the parameters in the model that generates signals.1 In reality, identifying and 
collecting information on potential projects and assessing whether making an investment is 
worthwhile represent substantial obstacles and expenses to investment; therefore the investors’ 
information on the projects is far from perfect. In this paper we will present a model of 
investment under uncertainty in which investors must deal with two types of uncertainty: the 
objective uncertainty in the data (the luck of the draws from the model given the parameters) and 
the subjective uncertainty about the data generating model (i.e., the uncertainty about the 
parameters that determine the distribution of the draws). With a sudden change in environment 
or a regime change, subjective uncertainty is likely to be substantially increased, and by much 
more for some agents than for other agents. We are interested in studying how an investor’s 
response to objective uncertainty depends on the degree to which an investor’s subjective 
uncertainty is raised and the extent of his information about the data generating model.  
The key difference between our model and the option value theory of investment under 
uncertainty lies in investor’s information structure. Investors are assumed to update their 
information from observations of signals and this influences their decision on whether to invest. 
Unlike the standard investment problem, the option value of waiting depends not only on the 
                                                 
1 Other papers have considered multiple sources of uncertainty within the context of irreversible and partially 
irreversible models of investment. Bertola and Caballero (1994) show that for irreversible investment the required 
return is higher when the price of new capital is more volatile. In the partially irreversible investment model 
presented in Bloom et al (2007) in which firm-level investment response to policy and demand shocks is more 
cautious during periods of high uncertainty.   
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objective uncertainty, but also on investor’s information and Bayesian updating on the project.2 
The investor’s uncertainty on the prospect of the project diminishes as the investor observes 
more signals of the project. For an informed investor, the uncertainty is small and the threshold 
of return that triggers investment is lower than that of an uninformed investor.  
In our model, even when different investors observe the same macroeconomic data, their 
responses to changes in the macroeconomic environment are dependent on their subjective 
uncertainty. If the subjective uncertainties are time varying across investors, then there does not 
exist a stable empirical relationship in the aggregate response of the investors to changes in 
macroeconomic variables. Informed investors tend to be more sensitive to macro-uncertainty 
than less informed investors. The investor’s knowledge makes a particularly large difference 
when the economy is in a state characterized by greater uncertainty and higher potential expected 
return. Simulation of the model suggests that in the wake of such a state total investment may 
increase and will be characterized by an abnormally high percentage of investment by informed 
investors.3  
Bayesian updating of subjective uncertainty is not a new concept, neither is the notion 
that time-varying objective uncertainty affects optional value of an investment. But the empirical 
implications of the theory in the present paper, that investors’ subjective uncertainty influences 
the timing of investment, are rarely tested, mainly because of lack of good proxies of investors’ 
subjective uncertainty on investment projects. Our empirical test of the theory is based on firm 
                                                 
2 Bayesian learning has been applied in macroeconomic models in a number of contexts. Jovanovic (1979) and 
Prescott and Townsend (1980) provide theoretical analysis of labor market equilibrium when workers’ productivity 
is learned over time through Bayesian updating. In an infinite period optimal control setting, Easley and Kiefer 
(1988) and Weiland (2000) show how policy makers should conduct experiment to draw inference about the 
parameters in the economy through Bayesian learning in the process of maximizing the posterior expectation of an 
objective function. 
3 Some extensions of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) obtain the outcome that increases in uncertainty will increase 
investment. For example, Abel et al’s (1996) options model of partially irreversible investment generates the result 
that given a potentially favorable resale price of capital, an increase in investment might be generated by a rise in 
uncertainty.  
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level FDI data where an investing firm’s subjective uncertainty can be proxied by the investment 
history it experienced with the host firm. Our test shows that investor experience plays a 
prominent role in FDI decision in a time of heightened uncertainty.     
Our empirical test is based on micro-data on inward FDI to Korea during and after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. The behavior of the Korean won/US dollar exchange rate is 
extraordinary over 1997-1998. Figure 1 shows the sharp depreciation of the Korean won relative 
to the US dollar over 10 year period for monthly data beginning in 1991. Before the collapse of 
the Korean won during the financial crisis, the currency was under a managed floating exchange 
rate regime where daily fluctuation of the spot rate was restricted within a band relative to the 
U.S. dollar. During the Asian financial crisis, the won/dollar rate jumped from 965 in October of 
1997 to 1695 in December 1997 before settling down to about 1200 in the beginning of 1999. 
The sharp depreciation of the won made assets denominated in the Korean currency much 
cheaper for foreign investors from the end of 1997 through 1998, but was also a period 
characterized by considerable uncertainty about the data generating model. 
Figure 1: Exchange Rate (Korean won/U.S. dollar): three-month moving average  
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Despite the heightened uncertainty, FDI to Korea in the twelve month period after the 
outbreak of crisis in November 1997 jumped by 70% in U.S. dollar value over that of the 
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preceding period twelve months. A disproportionably high fraction of the FDI made immediately 
following the crisis came from foreign investors with previous experience in Korea compared to 
foreign investors with no previous experience in Korea. Thus, during a period of heightened 
uncertainty informed investors act with the most opportune timing. 
From data in earlier years we identify 30% of the 10,405 instances of firm-level FDI in 
Korea between 1996 and 2001 as being by investors with experience. FDI by investors with 
experience tends to be larger and constitutes over 50% of the value of the $36.6 billion dollar 
inward FDI total to Korea over 1996-2001. We conduct regression analysis to estimate the 
marginal effects of the macro-factors on FDI conditioning on the investors’ information in two 
types of models: FDI event counts modeled by a negative-binomial regression; and the 
likelihood that a given FDI incidence with a particular investor feature is modeled as a binomial 
logit regression. In the negative-binomial regressions, we find that the number of FDI counts 
from experienced investors is much more responsive to changes in exchange rates and exchange 
rate uncertainty than that from inexperienced investors. In the binomial logit regressions, we find 
that FDI made at time of heightened exchange rate uncertainty and FDI of large size are more 
likely to be by the experienced foreign investor. The results confirm that information of investors 
is a critical determinant of firm-level FDI response to the exchange rate during a period of 
heightened uncertainty.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of investment 
under uncertainty with Bayesian learning. Section 3 describes the FDI data. Section 4 presents a 
brief review of the literature on the relationship between FDI and the exchange rate. Section 5 
presents estimates of negative binomial and multinomial logit regression models of FDI. Section 
6 concludes. 
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2.  A Model of Investment under Uncertainty with Bayesian Learning 
2.1 The Specifics of the Model 
In the model an investor observes a signal of expected return to a project, and chooses 
between investing in the project in the current period and waiting to reconsider investment in the 
next period. The investor must deal with the objective uncertainty in the data given the model 
and the subjective uncertainty about the data-generating model.4 To highlight the importance of 
the role of investor’s information, we set up a model in which all uncertainty in data depends on 
the state of the macroeconomy. The macroeconomic shock generates a signal for each project. 
The signal comes from the same distribution but may be different ex-post for each project. The 
investors may respond differently to the same observed signals, due to difference in investor 
information. The expected return depends on the state of the economy and on an investor’s 
assessment of the impact of the state of the economy on the return of his prospective project. 
There are two states of the macroeconomy; a high uncertainty state and a normal state. When the 
economy is in the high uncertainty state, or crisis state for emphasis, the potential expected 
return has a macroeconomic scaling factor 1mM t =  that is larger than that in the normal state 
. The value of M is known in each period to investors. Suppose in period t the economy is in 
crisis (in state s=1) then the variance of the draw 
2m
22
Ct σσ =  is larger than that under a normal state, 
22
Nt σσ = . If the macro state is  (j=1 or 2), then expected return is given by  js
ttt Mx ερ += ,         (1) 
where tε  follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 2tσ , ),0( 2tN σ . The 
                                                 
4 The model differs from that in McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit (1989), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
in which investors know the model that generates signals. In the benchmark model of an infinite horizon continuous 
time framework with the return following the Brownian motion (the continuous time version of discrete time 
random walk) there exists an analytical solution for optimal timing of investment.  
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transition probabilities for economy-wide uncertainty of the next period (j) conditioning on the 
current state (i) are given by , with for (i=1,2).  jip , ∑
=
=
2
1
, 1
j
jip
 A key assumption is that the mean of the expected return, ρ M, is unknown to the 
investor because the parameter ρ is unknown. When the economy is hit by a crisis, the potential 
return (indicated by M) is higher, but the impact on the project is not known to the investor. 5 
Some projects are more affected by crisis than others. The investor’s information plays a more 
important role in making precise assessment at the time of crisis. The investor learns about the 
implication of the state of the economy on the project under consideration as more data become 
available over time. The new data are combined with prior information through Bayesian 
learning. The prior information of the investor before observing any data is assumed to be a 
normal distribution ).,(~ 2000 ωρπ N  This initial prior may be different for different investors. 
The other source of the difference in investors’ information is the number of observations drawn 
from the project at a given state of the economy. The period-t prior about the parameter ρ  
(before observing the signal in the period) is denoted as π. The investor’s knowledge (the 
posterior) after observing the period-t signal is denoted by π’. The normality of the posterior 
follows from that of the model and the normality of the prior.   
An investor has two possible courses of action. First, he may make the investment in the 
current period; second, he may wait to the next period before taking any action. Without causing 
                                                 
         5The assumption that a crisis raises potential expected mean is the more interesting situation to analyze. It also 
provides a parallel with our empirical example. First, in the Asian crisis the sharp depreciation of domestic currency 
is temporarily far beyond the long term purchasing power parity level, so that overall FDI becomes inexpensive. 
Second, the Korean FDI data show that in the wake of crisis overall FDI increased. It is plausible to assume that a 
large number of investors believed that the potential return is increased despite the atypical uncertainty. Note that 
the assumption of increase in potential expected return does not imply the expected return for each project is higher, 
due to the randomness in parameter ρ . Furthermore, the conclusion that the informed investors have lower threshold 
of required return still holds if we assume the potential expected is not increased by the crisis.  
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confusion, we drop the subscript that represents the state of the economy. Let V(s,x,π) be the 
value of project when the current expected return is x and the variance of x is 2σ  in state s 
conditioning on parameter ρ . The next period expected return is x’. The dynamic programming 
problem is characterized by the following Bellman’s equation:  
)}1/(),,|',','(,0,max{),,( rxsxsEVxxsV += πππ .    (2) 
The value of waiting before discounting, ),,|',','( ππ xsxsEV , is the conditional expectation with 
respect to the macro state of the next period (s’), the next period’s signal (x’), and the posterior 
(π’) of parameter ρ , given the current macro-state (s), the observed signal (x), and investor’s 
prior (π).  
The normality of the prior of ρ implies that it can be captured by the mean and variance 
parameters, with ),(~ 2ωρπ N . The updating of investor’s knowledge (from π to π’ ) is based on 
the Bayes rule. Given the current macro-state s, the investor knows M and σ  but not ρ . The 
investor also observes the signal from a host (or project) given in (1), x. Then given the 
prior ),(~ 2ωρπ N , the posterior follows a normal distribution:  
  )','(}
2
)(exp{}
2
)(exp{),,|( 22
2
2
2
ωρω
ρρ
σ
ρπρπ NMxxs ∝−−−−∝ .  
Here the variance of the posterior 
12222 )(' −−− += σωω M .       (3) 
The mean of posterior 
)()'(' 222 −− += σωρωρ xM .       (4) 
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The Bayesian updating implies a shrinking posterior variance ( ωω <' ), i.e., as the 
investor observes more data, his uncertainty about the parameter ρ  is reduced. There is a 
reduction in posterior mean if the observation is lower than the prior mean ( ρρ <' if Mx ρ< ).  
The solution of the optimal investment problem (2) can be characterized by a 
threshold at which the investor is indifferent in making investment and 
waiting,
*x
)1/(),,|',','( ** rxsxsEVx += ππ . If x>  then it is optimal to invest. The optimal 
threshold depends on the investor’s assessment of parameter uncertainty and the state of the 
economy. The overall uncertainty of the investor about x’ of the next period is given by the 
predictive density of x’, defined as
*x
),,|'( πxsxf i = , obtained 
through weighing the normal likelihood of x’ for each value of parameter 
∑ ∫
=
2
1
, ),,|(),|'(
j
ijji dxssxlp ρπρπρ
ρ  by the posterior of 
ρ after current period observation of x at state . The result is a mixture of normal distributions: is
.)','(),,|'(
2
1
222
,∑ += =j jjjjii MMNpxsxf ωσρπ    (5)  
Equation (5) shows that for each given state of economy, the uncertainty in the investor’s 
predicted draw of signal of the next period is the sum of the uncertainty in data, 2σ , and the 
uncertainty of investor’s assessment in the mean of the expected return, 22 'ωM .   
The condition (5) shows that with smaller posterior variance, 2'ω , the variance of predicted x’ is 
smaller, and the value of option for waiting is lower. The investor’s knowledge makes a 
particularly large difference when the economy is in the crisis state because the posterior 
variance 2'ω  is amplified by the higher potential expected return . In the absence of subjective 
uncertainty about parameter
jM
ρ , 'ρ  becomes the true parameter value of ρ and 'ω  becomes zero. 
In this case the problem becomes one of standard value of option for investment, where the only 
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source of uncertainty is the state of the economy and the luck of the draw for the project given 
the state of the economy. Under this scenario, the standard conclusion that increases in 
uncertainty σ  raise the threshold of required returns follows.     
The substance of this section is summarized in the following remarks. First, in the 
standard investment problem, the investor has perfect knowledge about the parameters of the 
distributions that generate draws for returns to a project, which determines the option value of 
waiting.  In the present model the option value of waiting depends on the investor’s uncertainty 
on the prospect of the project, and the uncertainty diminishes as the investor observes more 
signals of the project (as the updating formula (3) implies). For an informed investor, the 
uncertainty ω  is small and the threshold of x that triggers investment is lower than that of an 
uninformed investor. This means that for the same macroeconomic uncertainty, the informed 
investors are more likely to commit funds than uninformed investors.  
Our model suggests that larger macro-uncertainty raises the option value of waiting for 
two reasons. First, the heightened uncertainty makes option more valuable given investor’s 
knowledge about the prospect of the project. Second, the updating formula (3) shows that if the 
crisis amplifies project uncertainty σ more than potential return M, then the signal x becomes 
noisier in the crisis period, and the precision of the posterior is improved more slowly, which 
also makes waiting more desirable.  
 2.2 A Numerical Example 
  To examine the properties of the theoretical model intuitively, we will now present some 
numerical results on the optimal policy. We draw the expected return x using model (1). We then 
simulate the distribution of the threshold of the experienced investor,  and calculate the 
number of cases that have the threshold  above the simulated data x.  
,*x
*x
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  We assume for the normal (non-crisis state) M=0.5 and Nσ =0.05; for the atypical or 
crisis state M=1.0 and Nσ =0.2. If the economy is at the crisis state, the probability of staying in 
such state is 0.8; and if the economy is at a normal state, the probability of staying in such state is 
0.999. We let the discount rate r=0.01. Simulations show that higher discount rates produce 
qualitatively the same result. We consider the case that there are 4 types of investor firms, each 
numbers 10,000 in period t=1. The four types of firm observe draws from the same distribution 
of expected returns governed by (1), with the parameter 2.0=ρ  and face the same macro state. A 
type i investor firm (i=1,..4) is characterized by an ex-ante identical initial prior 
parameter ρ centered at 0.2 but with a standard deviation ranging from 0.1 for type 1 to 0.7 for 
type 4. By design, the only difference across potential projects ex-ante is the investor’s 
uncertainty concerning the prospect of the project.  
  For each potential project, we simulate 5 periods of expected returns from model (1) and 
update the investor’s posterior for the parameter ρ . The realized states are: crisis for t=1, and 
normal states for t=2, 3, 4, 5. We start the simulation at the crisis state so that the numbers of 
investors with given information sets at the time of crisis can be perfectly controlled. Therefore 
ex-post difference in investment decisions across different types of investor firms is solely due to 
the initial information sets of investors. A more realistic model assumption is that for each firm 
the initial prior for parameter ρ  is dependent on the state of the macroeconomy, hence only 
observing signals from a project during normal state of the economy does not help in reducing 
the investor’ uncertainty about the project when the economy switches to a crisis state. By 
starting at a crisis state, we can avoid the complicating assumption of state-dependent initial 
priors and still produce simulation results that are approximately consistent with such a model. In 
the simulation, if the expected return drawn is above the threshold level given the current 
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posterior of investor uncertainty and macro state, then the project is funded and taken out of the 
pool of 10,000 potential projects. To evaluate the conditional expectation in (2), we use 10 point 
Gauss-Hermit quadrature to proxy distribution of continuous random variable, which is 
appropriate for normally distributed errors. We found through experiments that the 
approximation is highly accurate and much faster than grid search method.  
Simulation Results of Investment with Heightened Uncertainty (10,000 Potential Projects)  
Count of invested projects Standard deviation of initial prior 
(Higher number indicates 
less experience) During crisis period 
During 4 periods after 
the crisis Total over time 
0.1 3198 3675 6873 
0.3 2358 3490 5848 
0.5 1540 3731 5271 
0.7  1030 3886 4916 
Total count of 
Investment 
8126 14782 22908 
 
Note that the analysis of the theoretical model indicates that investor’s uncertainty about 
parameter ρ  is reduced over time as more data are observed, and the threshold of the expected 
return is lower when the investor’s uncertainty is lower. Investors’ initial priors reflect a high 
degree of uncertainty and it takes more observations to reduce the posterior variance of ρ  to a 
given level. It follows that these investors tend to take longer to decide to invest for a given set of 
observed data. When a financial crisis hits the economy, the mean and the variance of expected 
return are both high. As equation (5) shows, the uncertainty for the signal of next period is given 
by the sum of (objective) macro uncertainty 2σ  and (subjective) investor’s project-specific 
uncertainty 22 Mω . For an investor with a high subjective uncertainty ( 2ω ), the higher potential 
return M amplifies the overall uncertainty. For an investor with a small 2ω , the larger potential 
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return mainly represents a profitable opportunity. It is more likely that the informed investor will 
take advantage of the higher potential return. 
The simulation results confirm the above intuition. Note that the data for all investors are 
generated from the same distribution. But the most informed investors (with smallest standard 
deviation of 0.1 in the initial prior) made more investment (close to 32% of them did so) in the 
crisis period than the least informed investors with the largest standard deviation of 0.7 in the 
initial prior (only about 10% of them did so). If the first group is labeled as informed (or 
experienced) investors, and the rest as less experienced investors, then during the crisis period 
investment from the experienced investors account for 39% (3198 out of 8126) of the total cases, 
and after the crisis only 25% (3675 out of 14782). 
  Note that for the sake of simplicity, the theoretical model ignores many important factors 
in investment decisions, and should be viewed as illustrative instead of empirical. We will not try 
to strictly match the numerical simulation with the Korean data for that reason. The change in 
macro uncertainty and the mean of expected return affect the investors’ decision. The regression 
results reported later in the paper give marginal effect of the shifts in macro uncertainty (in 
exchange rate) and shifts in the mean of expected return, controlling other factors. One factor 
omitted from the theoretical model is the cost of information acquisition. We assume that in 
every period there is one signal observed without cost. In reality, assessment on investment 
projects typically involves substantial costs that may prevent many investors from obtaining new 
information on a regular basis. If the cost of information acquisition per dollar of investment is 
negatively correlated with the size of the investment, then one should expect large FDI to occur 
relatively more frequently around the time of crisis.  
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2.3 Empirical Implications  
 The above model is useful for analyzing the response of experienced investors to a shock 
in the expected return, given the specific information of investors. The corresponding empirical 
question to which we apply the model concerns the marginal effect of a shock in exchange rate 
to foreign direct investment. With heightened uncertainty, a favorable exchange rate is 
accompanied by greater macro uncertainty. The subjective uncertainty about the expected returns 
is amplified by the increase in the parameter M. This effect is smaller for informed investors. But 
the increase in M generates higher expected return for given ρ . Combining these two aspects of 
the theory, we conclude that informed investors respond more quickly to the crisis. This 
implication of the model will be examined in subsequent sections.6  
3. The Korean FDI Data 
Data on inward FDI to Korea is from Invest Korea, Korea Trade and Investment 
Promotion Agency in the Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Energy. The data set records the 
date and amount of inward FDI for Korea and is monthly. Between January 1996 and December 
2001, there are 10,405 observations on FDI. Data are available on FDI for several earlier years, 
but this data set is used to identify FDI events in the period starting in January 1996 as being 
first-time or repeat FDI by investors.7 A substantial cost in making FDI is the intangible cost in 
collecting information on potential projects which we believe is influenced by the experience of 
the foreign investor.8 The specific affiliation characteristics of a foreign investor firm is its 
                                                 
6 In trade theory, Rauch and Trindade (2003) show that improved information makes trade more responsive 
to international price differentials. Our argument on the exchange rate and FDI is analogous to their argument. 
7 Some foreign investors have started investing in Korea prior to January 1996, in which case their FDI 
activity during the sample will be correctly identified as experienced rather than as first-time. 
8 These costs include the foreign investor being required to file notification to the Korea Investment Service 
Center (KISC) or to domestic and overseas trade centers of KOTRA (Invest Korea, Korea Trade and Investment 
Promotion Agency). The notification within the scope of industries permitted for foreign investment appears to be a 
formality. At the time of notification, tangible costs of incorporation expenses are on average 3% in metropolitan 
areas and about 2% outside metropolitan areas (Invest Korea). 
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experience in making FDI in Korea, including repeated FDI experience with a specific host firm, 
and whether or not it has managerial control over the host firm. 
Table 1 reports the size distribution of FDI events over 1994:11-2001:10, with data 
reported annually starting in November so as to capture behavior over the financial crisis 
reflected in accelerated deterioration in the value for the Korean won starting in November of 
1997. A striking feature of the data in Table 1 is that the dollar value of FDI from November, 
1997 to October, 1998 was 70% higher than FDI in the immediately preceding twelve months. 
The size distribution exhibits an interesting time-varying pattern in that the average size of FDI 
is larger in the post-crisis period starting in November 1997 than in the 12-month period 
immediately before the financial crisis.  
  Table 2 shows the counts and amounts of FDI made over 1996:1-2001:12 grouped by 
investor experience profile. Of all 10,405 FDI events, 3119 events were by investors as second or 
subsequent experiences of FDI in Korea. Cases with FDI made by an investor with experience 
are 30.0% of the number of cases and 50.7% of the amount of FDI. Furthermore, Table 2 shows 
that the count of FDI involving the same investor/host firm pair (at their second and subsequent 
interactions) is 2418. Thus, the great majority of experienced investors repeat FDI with the same 
host firm. These “paired” foreign investor firms are likely to be the most informed investors.  
It is striking that during the short period following outbreak of the Asian Financial crisis 
in Korea during which the won is at its lowest value, 1997:11-1998:7, the share of total FDI in 
value by investors with paired experience is 52.4%, higher than the 35.9% share for the pre-crisis 
period 1996:1-1997:10 and the 40.1% share for the post-crisis period 1998:8-2001:12. 
Experienced investors played an especially prominent role in a short period after the crisis, and 
the combination of value and count of FDI suggests that individual FDI by investors with 
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experience is larger than that by inexperienced investors. These observations are consistent with 
the implications of the model of investment with heterogeneous information and heightened 
uncertainty presented in Section 2. 
The counts data in Table 2 shows that for the sample period, FDI counts from investors 
with experienced in the host firm make up 23.3% (2418/10405) of total FDI incidences. For the 
short-sample period 1996:1-1998:10 (before the relaxation of capital controls), FDI counts share 
from the same experienced investor group is 37.7% of total FDI incidences. The numbers 
suggest that the composition of the FDI cases during the crisis is substantially different from the 
whole sample period. The counts of FDI larger than one million dollars and are made by 
experienced investors for the sample period 1996:1-1998:10 make up 15.4% of total FDI counts, 
for the whole sample it is 10%. As we note above, during the short period of the crisis, FDI from 
experienced investors makes up a larger share of total FDI. Furthermore, 45.1% of all of FDI 
incidence from the experienced investors takes place during the short period while 27.8% of all 
FDI incidence and 23.9% of FDI from inexperienced investors take place during the period 
1996:1-1998:10.   
The cross time and cross sectional dimensions of the FDI incidence motivates the 
regression analyses of the present study. The negative binomial regression captures the variation 
of counts of FDI by one type of investor with macroeconomic variables, and the binomial logit 
regression captures the variation of monthly composition of FDI cases from experienced and 
inexperienced investors. The regressions are based on the whole sample period 1996:1-2001:12 
as well as the shorter period 1996:1-1998:10. Note that the estimates for the shorter period reflect 
the variations of FDI counts or share of FDI from experienced investors to macroeconomic 
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uncertainty within that period, so we learn more about the marginal effect of the macroeconomic 
uncertainty beyond that reflected by the summary statistics across different sample periods.  
   The role played by experienced foreign investors during the crisis is illustrated in Figure 
2 with a plot of the 3-month moving average of the percentage of the count of FDI by foreign 
investors with paired experience in total count of FDI over the period 1996-2001. During the 
crisis period (November 1997 to July 1998), the share of counts of investors with paired 
experience in total counts of FDI shows a sharp increase compared to the pre-crisis period. As 
the economy stabilized, FDI cases from inexperienced investors dominated and the share of FDI 
from experienced investors steadily declined, until near the end of the sample period, when both 
exchange rate and uncertainty rose again, as Figure 1 shows. 
       Figure 2: Fraction of FDI count by experienced foreign investors 1996:01-2001:12 
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The surge of FDI by inexperienced investors at the end of 1998 is reinforced by the 
relaxation of capital control by the Korean Government in November 1998. Since the 1980s, the 
Korean government has adopted a series of measures of capital liberalization. On regulations 
concerning FDI, a new FDI regime passed by National Assembly on September 2nd, 1998, and 
effective November 17th, 1998 was a landmark event. This legislation instituted policies 
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designed to expedite and encourage FDI through tax advantages, reduction in restrictions and red 
tape, and opening of previously restricted sectors. These changes reduce the cost of FDI in 
Korea.9
Finally, in review of the data, we note from Table 2 that the story of FDI in Korea over 
1996:1-2001:12 is overwhelmingly about foreign investors making investment in unlisted host 
firms (that are not publicly traded) rather than in listed firms on KSE and KOSDAQ. A firm is 
taken as foreign-owned if it bears the same name as the foreign investor. Of 4099 FDI received 
by foreign-owned firms, only 30 FDI were received by foreign-owned firms listed in Korea. 
Unlisted (majority owned) domestic firms received 6068 FDI and listed firms received 268 FDI 
(including the 30 FDI to foreign-owned listed firms).  
4. Brief Review of Literature on FDI and the Exchange Rate 
In recent years a wealth of theories and empirical tests has been developed on how 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) responds to changes in macroeconomic variables. 10 The 
emphasis in the literature is to examine the relationship between FDI and the exchange rate for 
given firm-specific characteristics. A positive association between depreciation and inward FDI 
is hypothesized in influential papers by Froot and Stein (1991), through the role of imperfect 
                                                 
9 The tax and other incentives are targeted for larger FDI projects and for projects in certain sectors such as 
the high technology industries. Foreign investors benefit from exemption on rent and fees, as well as support for 
residential facilities such as medical, education and housing support. In designated Foreign Investment Zones 
foreign investors also benefit from outstanding infrastructure such as roads, railways, airports, seaports, utilities, and 
telecommunication facilities.  
10 Blonigen (2005) surveys empirical work on FDI determinants and emphasizes the need for more firm-
level empirical analysis of hypotheses in the literature. The main insight from industrial organization regarding FDI 
is that it increases at the level of the firm the value of domestic assets, through better foreign management expertise, 
better monitoring of the management, and easier adoption of technology. Caves (1971) surveys and assesses these 
arguments. Razin and Sadka (2002) theorize that foreign companies are better at evaluating the prospects of 
domestic firms. Mody et al. (2002) show with country-level data that foreign investors have information advantages 
in countries having low corporate governance and accounting standards. Lipsey (2000) notes that inward and 
outward FDI tend to move together, suggesting that that the primary function of FDI is allowing for efficient foreign 
owners to gain control of domestic companies rather than financing capital formation. In the classic work by 
Dunning (1988) on the ownership, location, and internalization framework of the multinational firm, the exchange 
rate influences FDI through effects on costs of production, and in Markusen (2002) the location of stages of 
production is determined endogenously by where factors of production used intensively are relatively cheap. 
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financial markets and financially restricted domestic firms, and by Blonigen (1997), based on 
goods markets imperfections generating differential value to foreign and domestic investors of 
firm-specific assets. The literature on the effect of increased uncertainty about the exchange rate 
on FDI has either proceeded by considering risk-averse firms making investment decisions prior 
to the resolution of uncertainty as in Cushman (1985) and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), with 
effects depending on firm-specific assumptions, or has been based on options theory developed 
by Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) as in Campa (1993), with a rise in uncertainty 
about exchange rates causing a delay in FDI.  
In the model of investment under uncertainty with Bayesian learning in this paper, 
experience influences investor response to shifts in expected return and uncertainty induced by 
changes in the macro economy. Familiarity with investment in a particular industry and region 
being relevant for subsequent FDI has been addressed by a number of authors. Blonigen et al. 
(2005) report that investment within a region by a Japanese manufacturing firm’s Keiretsu group 
increases likelihood of further investment in that region by that firm.11 Chang and Rosenzweig 
(2001) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) report that experience influences entry mode by 
foreign firms into the U.S. electronics and chemical industries and by large Dutch firms into 
many countries, respectively. That FDI is a sequential process with significant agglomeration 
benefits is well established in the literature.12 However, consideration of how investor response 
                                                 
11 In related work, Kogut and Chang (1996) find that the likelihood of an investment by Japanese firms in 
U.S. electronic industries is greater if the firm has made previous investments. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996) 
find that Japanese investment in Southeast Asia is significantly influenced by inter-firm connections. 
12 In early contributions to the literature on the multinational firm, Davidson (1980) finds that prior 
experience in a country is likely to increase a firm’s investment in that country and Kogut (1983) argues that 
decisions by multinational companies to initially establish a plant in a country are motivated by considerations that 
may differ from those influencing subsequent investment decisions. Head et al. (1995) has emphasized the 
importance of agglomeration benefits in FDI decisions. Clearly the issue of experience and agglomeration effects in 
determining FDI is related to the issue of trade networks with emphasis on a search process developed by Rauch 
(1999). 
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to the exchange rate is influenced by investor experience with FDI has not appeared in the 
literature. 
The empirical work on the influence of the level and uncertainty of the exchange rate on 
FDI yields results that vary across country and time. Empirical work by Blonigen (1997), Kogut 
and Chang (1996), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), Klein and Rosengren (1994), Froot and Stein 
(1991), and Cushman (1985), amongst others, mostly on FDI flows at the aggregate and/or 
industry level, finds that dollar depreciation leads to increased FDI into the U.S., with the 
implication that this is a robust result.13 Less numerous than investigations of the effect of the 
exchange rate on FDI, empirical results on the effect of volatility of exchange rates on FDI vary, 
with Cushman (1985) and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) finding a positive association and 
Campa (1993) finding the reverse. 
5. Regression Analysis 
In this paper we use two types of regression models to explore different dimensions of 
the data on the link between the exchange rate and inward FDI to Korea over 1996:1-1998:10 
and 1996:1-2001:12. These periods contain greater volatility of the exchange rate than those that 
have normally been analyzed in connection with FDI. We estimate macro and firm-specific 
effects on the FDI case-counts to different categories in a negative-binomial regression and the 
probability that a given FDI incidence belongs to a particular category in a binomial logit 
regression. 
 
                                                 
13In an exception to the general findings for the U.S., Dewenter (1995) using transaction-specific data 
reports that the real exchange rate is not correlated with FDI to the U.S. for most industries when overall investment 
and corporate wealth are controlled. Studies on sensitivity of inward FDI to the real exchange rate for other OECD 
countries report fewer statistically significant results than for the U.S. For example, Froot and Stein (1991) find 
statistically insignificant effects for the UK, Canada, and Japan. For developing countries, Kiyota and Urata (2005) 
report heterogeneous findings among researchers on the effects of the exchange rate and uncertainty (measured by 
exchange rate volatility) on FDI. 
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5.1. Modeling the Monthly FDI Counts: The Negative Binomial Model  
We are interested in exploring how the FDI counts to different firms respond to changes 
in macro variables such as exchange rates. The count data are often modeled by Poisson process. 
Preliminary examination of Poisson models shows substantial over-dispersion.14 As a result, we 
consider the negative binomial model for each type. The negative binomial model has a number 
of economic applications, e.g., see Hausman et al. (1984) and Blonigen (1997). Suppose the FDI 
cases of a given type j in period t is . The negative binomial model is given by NB(jtn jjt δγ , ), 
where exp( )jt t jXγ β=  is the mean, and δ  measures over-dispersion. When the dispersion 
parameter approaches zero, the negative binomial model becomes Poisson.  
5.1.1 Macroeconomic variables 
Macroeconomic variables, tX , that will be taken to influence FDI include the exchange 
rate, volatility of the exchange rate,  and a measure of capital control by the Korean government. 
The 3-month moving average of the Korean won/U.S. dollar exchange rate will be used to 
indicate expected exchange rate.15 The logarithm of a 3-month moving average of the standard 
deviation of the daily change in the won/dollar exchange rate each month, , will serve as 
a proxy for uncertainty about the exchange rate. The realized day-to-day volatility of the 
exchange rate is a reasonable way of capturing uncertainty about future values of the exchange 
rate. As a robustness check we will also use a 3-month moving average of exchange rate 
volatility estimated by GARCH, , as an alternative measure of exchange rate 
)(sdexL
)(garchL
                                                 
14 The values of Pearson Chi-sq and deviance divided by the degrees of freedom are significantly larger 
than 1 in all cases.  
15Cushman (1985), Froot and Stein (1991), Klein and Rosengren (1994), and Blonigen (1997) investigate 
the effect on FDI of the current (real value) of the exchange rate. Campa (1993) measures expected exchange rate by 
either (perfect foresight) of exchange rate over next 2 years or static expectation based on past two years. 
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volatility.16 Figure 3 indicates that both  and  peak during the early stages of 
financial crisis (with ) peaking somewhat before ), exhibit considerable 
volatility throughout the 1996:1-2001:12 period, and move in line the exchange rate in Figure 2.  
)(sdexL )(garchL
)(sdexL )(garchL
Figure 3: Exchange rate volatility measures: 1996:1-2001:12  
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During the Asian financial crisis, the Korean won lost about half its value against the 
U.S. dollar within two months and rebounded steadily in the next three years following the 
collapse. On December 3, 1997, in agreement with the IMF the Central Bank of Korea is 
instructed to support the won whenever the won/dollar rate goes above 1300.17 A won/dollar rate 
of 1300 was seen as representing a substantial devaluation and values in excess of 1300 were 
viewed as excessive relative to the 800 to 900 levels that had prevailed over several years prior 
to November 1997. The won/dollar rate exceeded 1300 on December 8, 1997 and would not fall 
                                                 
16A survey of measures of exchange rate volatility used in the FDI literature can be found in Kiyota and 
Urata (2004). Campa (1993) measures exchange rate volatility as the standard deviation of monthly change in the 
logarithm of the exchange rate. Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) measure exchange rate volatility as the normalized 
standard deviation of twelve quarters of the real exchange rate prior to and inclusive of the current quarter. Cushman 
(1985) introduces the average level of “surprise” as a measure of uncertainty given by the deviation of the currently 
observed real exchange rate from that expected, in addition to measuring volatility in the exchange rate by the 
standard deviation of quarterly changes in the real exchange rate within the current year. 
17 During the Asian crisis the IMF set target levels for the exchange rate and Korean interest rates were to 
be raised whenever the won/dollar rate exceeded 1300.  
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below 1300 again until July 7, 1998. To provide further robustness checks of our results we will 
use two additional indicators of uncertainty beside  and . If ex  is the 3-month 
moving average won/dollar exchange rate, the additional measures of volatility are monthly 
series given by  and 
)(sdexL )(garchL
}200/)1300{((exp) −≡ exeV }0,1300max{01.0(max) −≡ exV . The first measure of 
uncertainty captures a non-linearity, in that deviations of the exchange rate from 1300 indicate 
proportionately greater uncertainty than indicated by the amount ex  exceeds 1300, and the 
second measure of uncertainty captures a non-linearity confined mostly to the period of the 
financial crisis, when ex  repeatedly exceeds 1300. These measures of exchange rate volatility 
are shown in Figure 3. 
A capital control index, cc , set at zero up through 1998:10 and set at 1 after 1998:10, is 
included in tX . In order to isolate the effect of relaxation of capital controls from the crisis 
period negative binomial and binomial logit regressions will be reported for 1996:1-1998:10, a 
period that embraces the financial crisis and immediately precedes the new era of relaxed capital 
control, and for 1996:1-2001:12, a sample period for the capital control index, cc , will be 
introduced as an explanatory variable.  
5.1.2. FDI case counts by experience 
MLE estimates of ( δβ , ) in negative binomial regressions are obtained and reported for 
count of FDI by investor and host firm with different levels and combinations of experience in 
Table 3. For the explanatory variables that are in logarithm, the estimates can be interpreted as an 
approximation of elasticity of the expected FDI counts with respect to the explanatory variables.  
In Table 3A negative binomial regressions are reported for 1996:1-1998:10. Regressions 
for total count of FDI, for count of FDI by investors with no experience, for count of FDI by 
investors with paired experience (the investor and host firm have prior FDI with each other 
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implying that FDI is a second or subsequent FDI), and for count of large FDI (FDI over one 
million dollars) by investors with paired experience are labeled (i)-(iii), (iv)-(vi), (vii)-(ix), and 
(x)-(xii). A dummy variable to capture the financial crisis, Crisis , set at 1 over 1997:11-1998:7, 
and zero otherwise, has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 10% level of 
confidence for count of FDI for all agents. The coefficient of Crisis  is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of confidence for count of FDI by investors with paired experience 
and is not statistically significant for count of FDI by investors with no experience. These results 
indicate that the increase in FDI during the financial crisis in Korea is driven by that for 
experienced investors relative to that by inexperienced investors. The coefficient on Crisis  is 
greatest for large FDI by experienced investors, a group likely to have the greatest information 
on investment prospects.  
The exchange rate ( , the logarithm of ex) has a statistically significant positive 
coefficient in regression (ii) in Table 3A. This result suggests that a devaluation of 10% leads to 
a 3.7% increase in total FDI count. In contrast, a 10% devaluation leads to a 5.3% rise in FDI 
count by investors with paired experience (regression (viii)) and to a 10.4% increase in the count 
of large FDI by investors with paired experience (regression (xi)). Uncertainty about the 
exchange rate ( ) also significantly raises FDI count by investors with paired experience 
with a more marked effect for large FDI within this group (from regressions (ix) and (xii)).
Lex
)(sdexL
18 
 and  are not statistically significant in the regressions for FDI by inexperienced 
investors.  
Lex )(sdexL
In Table 3B we report negative binominal regression results for monthly FDI count over 
1996:1-1998:10 for the same groups as in Table 3A, but for different measures of volatility of 
                                                 
18 Lex  and  are positively correlated and their appearance in the same regression results in 
imprecise estimates with neither variable being statistically significant. These results are not reported. 
)(sdexL
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the exchange rate. The result that experienced investors have a statistically significant positive 
response to increased volatility of the exchange rate, whereas inexperienced investors do not 
have a statistically significant response is robust across the alternative measures volatility.  
In Table 3C we report negative binominal regression results for monthly FDI count over 
1996:1-2001:12 for the two groups appearing in Table 3A that had the most divergent results, i.e., 
for the count of large FDI by investors with paired experience and count of FDI by investors 
with no experience. In the regression equations in Table 3C a capital control dummy is 
introduced to control for the change in capital control regime in November 1998. A positive 
value for cc indicates a relaxation of capital control. For the most part a relaxation of capital 
control resulted in a statistically significant increase in FDI count of both large FDI by investors 
with paired experience and FDI by inexperienced investors, but the coefficient for the 
inexperienced investors is of the order of 5 times as big as that for the count of large FDI by 
experienced pairs.  
The results in Table 3C for the effect of devaluation and exchange rate volatility on count 
of FDI over 1996:1-2001:12 are very similar to those found in Tables 3A and 3B over 1996:1-
1998:10. We find that over the period 1996:1-2001:12 large FDI by experienced investors has a 
statistically significant positive response to devaluation and to increased volatility of the 
exchange rate, but FDI by inexperienced investors does not. In results not reported, for the period 
1996:1-2001:12 we attempted to distinguish the role of experience by foreign investors from that 
of the host firm, by considering regressions for FDI by experienced foreign investors (n=3119) 
exclusive of FDI by investors with paired experience (n=3119-2418=701) and regressions for 
FDI by experienced host firms (n=3180) exclusive of FDI by investors with paired experience 
(n=3180-2428=762). The exchange rate and exchange rate volatility were not statistically 
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significant in influencing count of FDI to first-time host firms (foreign investors) from 
experienced foreign investors (host firms), suggesting that investors with paired experience is 
important in yielding sensitivity in count of FDI to devaluation and exchange rate volatility.19  
5.2. Modeling Likelihood of FDI by experience: Binomial Logit Regression Model  
In this section we will examine the impact of the exchange rate on the relative likelihood 
of different categories of experience of FDI with a binomial logit regression. This analysis will 
supplement that obtained from the negative binomial regressions on the effect of investor 
information on the connection between the exchange rate and FDI by allowing for the 
introduction of individual characteristics of size of FDI and whether the host firm is foreign or 
domestically owned.   
We note that a binomial logit model gives probability that each case is true among a set 
of mutually exclusive scenarios, conditioning on a set of observed control variables. Although 
binomial logit is commonly used to model discrete choice of economic agents, such a behavioral 
interpretation is not intrinsically related to the model. The interpretation of the estimated 
conditional probabilities in this study is not about an investor’s choice of being ‘experienced’ or 
‘inexperienced’. Instead, the estimates we present will capture the probability of a given incident 
of FDI falling into a particular category, conditional on macroeconomic variables and other the 
control variables.  The ‘reduced form’ interpretation of the binomial logit means that the 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property (the ratio of the conditional 
probabilities of two categories is independent of other categories) is plausible. 
                                                 
19 FDI when both agents are experienced is dominated by experienced pairs, and the numbers are not great 
enough to distinguish paired from experienced foreign investors and experienced host firms that are non-paired even 
for the 1996:1-2001:12 period. In Table 2 count of FDI by paired agents (as second and subsequent FDI) is 2418 out 
of 2496 cases of FDI in which both investor and host have prior FDI experience (whether paired or not). 
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For a binomial logit model, let the dummy variables ,1=jd 2 identify mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive categories of FDI. The likelihood of the type of FDI  is given by 
binomial distribution,  where 
),( 21 ddD =
,
1
2
1
∏∏
= =
T
t j
tjD
jtp 1=jtD  if 1jd =  and ,0=jtD  otherwise. The probability 
 is characterized by a logit modeljtp )}'exp(1/{)'exp(1 φφ ttt zzp += and default normalization 
)}'exp(1/{12 φtt zp += , where  is a vector of economic factors that determine the 
probabilities , .  By construction the logarithm of probability of FDI of type 1 over 
that of type 2 is given by
tz
jtp )2,1( =j
φ')/log( 21 ttt zpp = .  
5.2.1 Microeconomic variables  
Existing unlisted (majority owned) domestic firms are probably more likely to be open to 
potential inexperienced investors than are existing unlisted foreign (owned) firms. The influence 
on the probability that an FDI made to a domestic firm is by an experienced investor or not is 
recognized by introducing an indicator of type of host firm, Domestic , with Domestic =1 if the 
FDI host is an unlisted domestic firm, and 0 otherwise, into the vector . Similarly, the log of 
size of individual FDI, , is also introduced into the vector of economic factors .  
tz
Lsize tz
5.2.2 Likelihood of FDI by experience  
We will consider two categories of FDI that differ with regard to agent experience.20 
These categories are:  if FDI is by investors with paired experience (investor and host firm 
have at least one FDI experience before time t) and 0 otherwise, and 
1 1d =
2 1d =  for all other FDI and 
0 otherwise. Binomial logit regressions of the probability of whether FDI is more likely to be by 
                                                 
20 The groups are always mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Groups could be further subdivided into 
paired experience and the cases of an FDI involving experienced investors and inexperienced host firms, 
inexperienced investors and experienced host firms, no experience FDI. Not much is gained by this division that 
would come at the cost of adding more detail to Table 4.  
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an investors with paired experience rather than by all other investors (the default category) are 
reported in Table 4.  
In Table 4A binomial logit regressions (i)-(iv) and (v)-(viii) are reported for 1996:1-
1998:10 and for 1996:1-2001:12, respectively. The results indicate that with devaluation or a rise 
in exchange rate uncertainty, FDI is significantly more likely to be FDI by investors with paired 
experience relative to FDI by other investors, even when controlling for size of individual FDI 
and ownership of host firm. Thus, the results from the binomial regressions are consistent with 
those from the negative binomial regressions that experienced investors are more sensitive to 
high exchange rate volatility at a time of devaluation. The absence of FDI by inexperienced 
investors during the crisis, particularly as indicated in regressions (i)-(iv) in Table 4A for 1996:1-
1998:10, a period preceding the relaxation of capital controls, indicates that there is a very high 
cost in searching and evaluating host firms. 
In Table 4A, the log of size of individual FDI and the indicator of type of host firm are 
statistically significant. If an FDI is of large size, then it is significantly more likely to be 
associated with agents with paired experience. As expected, if an FDI involves a host that is a 
domestic firm then it is significantly more likely to be by an inexperienced investor. An 
alternative way of stating this result is that if FDI involves a host firm that is foreign owned, then 
it is significantly more likely to involve investors with paired experience. Put in this way, the 
finding is consistent with the observation by Lipsey (2001) that FDI is a relatively stable 
investment flow during crisis, and that experienced investors in foreign-owned firms make use of 
investment opportunities that allow them to grow rapidly. 21  FDI prompted by investors’ 
information makes a valuable contribution to recovery from crisis.  
                                                 
21 New FDI is provided over 1997:11-1998:7, even though the premium for liquidity measured by the 
Korean short-term interest rate jumped from about 13% in November 1997 to 23% in December 1997, and fell back 
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In regressions (v)-(viii) in Table 4A, relaxation of capital control is found, as expected, to 
make it much more likely that FDI is by inexperienced agents. As the crisis passes, new and 
inexperienced investors attracted by a favorable exchange rate and easing of capital control start 
to accumulate in the Korean market. In Table 4B the results in Table 4A are found to be robust 
across different measures of exchange rate volatility.  
The default category in Table 4, FDI by investors who are not investors with paired 
experience, is overwhelmingly first-time FDI by investors. From those making first-time FDI, ex 
post examination of data on first-time FDI by investors enables identification of those making 
one-time FDI and those who go on to become investors with paired experience by making 
subsequent FDI. In regression analysis not reported in the tables, we find that these two investor 
groups making first-time FDI do not react in different ways to the exchange rate. The results 
show devaluation is much more likely to result in FDI by investors with paired experience than 
by investors making FDI for the first-time, whether by investors who will eventually become 
experienced or by investors who will not participate in FDI again. However, results indicate that 
first-time FDI by what will become an investor with paired experience compared to first-time 
FDI that will turn out to be only one-shot FDI is likely to be significantly larger, more likely to 
establish a foreign-owned firm, and less likely when capital controls are relaxed. 
The results of this empirical section can be summarized as follows: the negative binomial 
counts regressions and the binomial logit regressions confirm that information (indicated by 
experience) of investors influences response to the exchange rate and volatility in the exchange 
rate; the relationship between the exchange rate and FDI need not be stable over time and is 
                                                                                                                                                             
to 12% only in July 1998. At the high premium there was evidence that liquidity was available. Borensztein and Lee 
(2002) with firm level data for Korea find no credit contraction in the first half of 1998. They find that total bank 
borrowing increased both in absolute terms and relative to other forms of finance for the average firm over the first 
half of 1998. 
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dependent on the mix of experienced and inexperienced foreign investors; capital controls are 
important regulatory barriers that keep relatively small inexperienced investors out of the 
domestic market and that policies to reduce the cost of finding an investor-host match could be a 
cost effective way of facilitating FDI.  
6. Conclusion  
In the model of investment under uncertainty with Bayesian updating presented in this 
paper, investors with different information take different courses of action with regard to 
investment. We argue that in situations in which there is a sudden change in environment, 
subjective uncertainty (about the model) is likely to be substantially and unevenly increased 
across investors. For a given state of economy, the uncertainty facing the investor is the sum of 
the uncertainty in the data and the uncertainty of the investor’s assessment of the mean of the 
expected return. Investor response to objective uncertainty is shown to depend on the level of 
information an investor has about the data generating model.  
Investors are assumed to update their information from observation of signals. This 
learning influences the decision on whether to invest. The investor’s knowledge makes a 
particularly large difference when the economy is in a state characterized by greater uncertainty 
and higher potential expected return. Simulation of the model suggests that in the wake of such a 
state the total number of investments may increase and will be characterized by an abnormally 
high percentage of investments by informed investors. 
We test the theory of heterogeneous information and investment under uncertainty with 
firm-level data on FDI to Korea during the unusual behavior of the Korean won/US dollar 
exchange rate at the time of the Asian financial crisis. We identify about 30% of the over 10,000 
instances of firm-level FDI data in Korea between 1996 and 2001 as being by experienced 
 29
investors, that is as being as second or subsequent FDI to Korea by the investor. In empirical 
work we examine two periods: 1996:1-1998:10 and 1996:1-2001:12. Both periods capture the 
period of the Asian financial crisis and the longer period allows for change in capital control.  
Results on the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI grouped by investor experience are 
similar in both samples.   
In negative-binomial regressions, we find that the FDI count for investors with paired 
experience, that is a second or subsequent FDI by a foreign investor with the same host firm, is 
responsive to changes in exchange rates and exchange rate uncertainty whereas that of FDI count 
for inexperienced investors is not. The count of FDI that is most sensitive to exchange rates and 
exchange rate uncertainty is that by investors with paired experience making FDI of large value. 
In the binomial logit regressions, controlling directly for size of FDI and host firm affiliation, we 
find that FDI by investors with paired experience is significantly more sensitive to the exchange 
rate than that of FDI by other investors.  
The empirical results bear out the implications of the theory of heterogeneous 
information and investment under uncertainty presented in this paper that information (indicated 
by experience) of investors influences how they will respond to the objective data (on exchange 
rate and volatility in the exchange rate). 
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 Table 1. Size Distribution of FDI in Korea over 1994:11-2001:10   
Number of FDI Size of FDI 
(millions US 
dollars)  
1994:11-
1995:10 
1995:11-
1996:10 
1996:11-
1997:10 
1997:11-
1998:10 
1998:11-
1999:10 
1999:11-
2000:10 
2000:11-
2001:10 
FDI≥1000 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1000>FDI≥
200 0 0 2 3 6 9 6 
200>FDI≥ 
100 0 2 2 8 9 13 6 
100>FDI≥ 
10 26 40 57 86 102 113 101 
10>FDI≥1 152 182 222 237 235 334 311 
1>FDI 533 709 685 823 1045 3539 2309 
Total 711 933 968 1157 1398 3009 2733 
        
Amount of FDI-millions US dollars Size of FDI 
(millions US 
dollars)  
1994:11-
1995:10 
1995:11-
1996:10 
1996:11-
1997:10 
1997:11-
1998:10 
1998:11-
1999:10 
1999:11-
2000:10 
2000:11-
2001:10 
FDI≥1000 0 0 0 0 1,612 1,342 0 
1000>FDI≥
200 0 0 502 941 1,519 3,122 2,196 
200>FDI≥ 
100 0 309 300 1,223 1,106 1,726 777 
100>FDI≥ 
10 600 915 1,485 2,179 3,011 3,473 2,664 
10>FDI≥1 424 534 653 723 840 1,095 979 
1>FDI 128 173 158 165 155 316 277 
Total 1152 1,930 3,099 5,231 8,244 11,075 6,894 
Source of data: Invest Korea, Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Commerce, Industry & 
Energy, Seoul, Korea. 
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 Table 2. The Role of Experience in FDI Cases: 1996:1-2001:12 (average size in parentheses)  
Number of cases of Experience  Host firm type: 
 # FDI Host firm Investor Investor & Host firm Paired None 
All firms: 
10405(3.52) 3180(6.09 ) 3119(5.95 ) 2496(6.11)  2418(6.17 ) 6137(2.29) 
Foreign-owned firms: 
4099(4.45) 1802(6.53)   1803(7.49) 1595(6.03) 1574(6.03) 2020(2.95) 
Unlisted 
Domestic firms: 6068(2.41) 1240(4.74)    1164(2.65) 795(5.26) 746(5.43) 4025(1.62) 
Listed firms 
(Public firms): 
268(14.76) 
138(12.46) 152(13.00) 106(13.68) 98(13.95) 92(16.90) 
Note: Investor experience - the investor has at least one prior FDI before the one counted (the host firm may or may 
not have FDI experience). Host firm experience - the host firm has at least one prior FDI before the one counted (the 
investor may or may not have FDI experience). Investor and host firm experience - both firms have had at least one 
prior FDI before the one counted (it may or may not have been with each other). Paired experience - the same 
host/investor pair had at least one prior FDI with one another before the one counted. None  - first-time FDI by 
agents that become an experienced pair and by agents that never have a repeat FDI experience (this is slightly 
smaller than the number of first time FDI for both investor and host firm). The large average size of FDI to listed 
firms with no experience is due to two large FDI of $321 million and $119 million. The number of FDI by host 
firm’s sub-categories exceeds the total number of FDI by 30, since 30 FDI went to listed foreign owned firms. An 
unlisted firm is taken as foreign-owned if it bears the same name as the foreign investor. 
Source of data: Invest Korea, Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Commerce, Industry & 
Energy, Seoul, Korea. 
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Table 3A. Negative Binominal Results: Monthly FDI Count by Investors with Different 
Experience Levels: 1996:1-1998:10  
FDI by all Investors (n=2896) FDI by Investors with no Experience (n=1468) 
  
Parameter 
i ii iii iv v vi 
Crisis 0.1532
c
(0.0835)   
0.0361 
(0.0936)   
Lex  0.3709
a
(0.1421)   
0.2001 
(0.1619)  
)(sdexL    0.0643
b
(0.0267)   
0.0335 
(0.0302) 
Dispersion 0.0352
a
(0.0115) 
0.0311a
(0.0105) 
0.0312a
(0.0110) 
0.0345a
(0.0142) 
0.0328a
(0.0140) 
0.0333a
(0.0141) 
 
FDI by Investors with paired 
experience 
(n=1091) 
Large FDI by Investors with paired 
experience 
(n=445) 
  
Parameter 
vii viii ix x xi xii 
Crisis 0.2716
a
(0.0983)   
0.4541a
(0.1351)   
Lex  0.5338
a
(0.1724)   
1.0361a
(0.2154)  
)(sdexL    0.0979
a
(0.0320)   
0.1855a
(0.0433) 
Dispersion 0.03616
a
(0.0165) 
0.0332 
(0.0158) 
0.0335 
(0.0158) 
0.0564 
(0.0327) 
0.0321 
(0.0259) 
0.0408 
(0.0278) 
 
Notes: Investors with paired experience refers to investor and host firm having FDI experience with each other 
prior to current FDI event. FDI by investors with no experience is first-time FDI by investors. Large FDI is 
FDI greater than or equal to $1 million. Crisis=index for financial crisis set at 1 over 1997:11-1998:7 and zero 
otherwise; Lex= log of 3-month moving average of exchange rate (won per dollar) centered on preceding 
month; Volatility- = the log of the of 3-month moving average of standard deviation of the daily 
change in the won/dollar exchange rate each month centered on the preceding month; Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance level of at least 99%, 95%, and 90% or above, 
respectively. 
)(sdexL
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Table 3B. Negative Binominal Results: Monthly FDI Count by Investors with Different 
Experience Level for Different Measures of Volatility of Exchange Rates: 1996:1-
1998:10 
FDI by all Investors (n=2896) FDI by Investors with no Experience (n=1468) 
Volatility =  
)(garchL  
Volatility 
=  (exp)V
Volatility 
=  (max)V
Volatility =  
)(garchL  
Volatility = 
  (exp)V
Volatility = 
 (max)V
Parameter 
i ii iii iv v vi 
Volatility 0.0578
b
(0.0271) 
0.0513 
(0.0321) 
0.0638 
(0.0470) 
0.0322 
(0.0303) 
0.0218 
(0.0349) 
0.0205 
(0.0509) 
Dispersion 0.0338
a
(0.0112) 
0.03631a
(0.0118) 
0.0373a
(0.0120) 
0.0335a
(0.0141) 
0.0348a
(0.0144) 
0.0352a
(0.0145) 
 
FDI by Investors with paired 
experience (n=1091) 
Large FDI by Investors with paired 
experience (n=445) 
Volatility =  
)(garchL  
Volatility 
=  (exp)V
Volatility 
=  (max)V
Volatility =  
)(garchL  
Volatility = 
  (exp)V
Volatility = 
 (max)V
Parameter 
vii viii ix x xi xii 
Volatility 0.0801
a
(0.0334) 
0.0775b
(0.0334) 
0.1038c
(0.0571) 
0.1684a
(0.0449) 
0.1402a
(0.0558) 
0.1770b
(0.0823) 
Dispersion 0.0394
b
(0.0173) 
0.0430a
(0.0180) 
0.0442a
(0.0184) 
0.0506 
(0.0304) 
0.0752b
(0.0363) 
0.0810b
(0.0379) 
 
Notes: Investors with paired experience refers to investor and host firm having FDI experience with each other 
prior to current FDI event. FDI by agents with no experience is first-time FDI by agents. Large FDI is FDI 
greater than or equal to $1 million. Volatility-  = log of 3-month moving average of monthly 
exchange rate volatility given by the conditional standard deviation generated by a GARCH process fitted to 
the exchange rate, centered on preceding month; Volatility is also measured alternatively 
by =  and by = , where ex  is 3-month moving average 
won/dollar exchange rate. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 
significance level of at least 99%, 95%, and 90% or above, respectively. 
)(garchL
(max)V }0,1300max{01.0 −ex (exp)V }200/)1300{( −exe
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Table 3C. Negative Binominal Results: Monthly FDI Count by Investors with Paired 
Experience (Large FDI only) and by Investors with No Experience: 1996:1-2001:12 
  
Large FDI by Investors with paired experience (n=1041) 
  
Volatility = 
 )(sdexL
Volatility =  
)(garchL  
Volatility = 
  (exp)V
Volatility = 
 (max)V
Parameter 
vii viii ix x xi xii 
Crisis 0.2474
b
(0.1202)      
Lex  0.9343
a
(0.2094)     
Volatility   0.1701
a
(0.0377) 
0.1135a
(0.0370) 
0.1703b
(0.0701) 
0.1251a
(0.0471) 
cc  0.0272 (0.0813) 
0.1885b
(0.0747) 
0.1844b
(0.0793) 
0.2549a
(0.0866) 
0.2020b
(0.0809) 
Dispersion 0.0559
a
(0.0214) 
0.0293a
(0.0166) 
0.0287 
(0.0165) 
0.0417 
(0.0188) 
0.0466 
(0.0197) 
0.0453 
(0.0194) 
 
FDI by Investors with no Experience (n=6137) 
  
Volatility = 
 )(sdexL
Volatility =  
)(garchL  
Volatility = 
  (exp)V
Volatility = 
 (max)V
Parameter 
vii viii ix x xi xii 
Crisis -0.7200
a
(0.2039)      
Lex  -0.0103 (0.2416)     
Volatility   -0.0111 (0.0377) 
-0.0306 
(0.0395) 
0.0128 
(0.0778) 
-0.0090 
(0.0514) 
cc  1.0476
a
(0.0947) 
1.0457a
(0.0846) 
1.0444a
(0.0842) 
1.0508a
(0.0897) 
1.0446a
(0.0849) 
Dispersion 0.3062
a
(0.0507) 
0.1124a
(0.0204) 
0.1122a
(0.0203) 
0.1111a
(0.0202) 
0.1124a
(0.0204) 
0.1123a
(0.0204) 
Notes: Investors with paired experience refers to investor and host firm having FDI experience with each other 
prior to current FDI event. FDI by investors with no experience is first-time FDI by investors. Large FDI is 
FDI greater than or equal to $1 million. Crisis=index for financial crisis set at 1 over 1997:11-1998:7 and zero 
otherwise; Lex= log of 3-month moving average of exchange rate (won per dollar) centered on preceding 
month; Volatility- = the log of the of 3-month moving average of standard deviation of the daily 
change in the won/dollar exchange rate each month centered on the preceding month; Standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. Volatility-  = log of 3-month moving average of monthly exchange rate volatility 
given by the conditional standard deviation generated by a GARCH process fitted to the exchange rate, 
centered on preceding month; Volatility is also measured alternatively by =  and 
by = , where ex  is 3-month moving average won/dollar exchange rate. cc= index of 
capital control set at zero prior to 1998:11, and set at 1 after 1998:11. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 
significance level of at least 99%, 95%, and 90% or above, respectively. 
)(sdexL
)(garchL
(max)V }0,1300max{01.0 −ex
(exp)V }200/)1300{( −exe
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Table 4A. Binomial Logit Regressions: Likelihood of FDI by Investors with Paired 
Experience Relative to that by Other Agents: 1996:1-1998:10 & 1996:1-2001:12 
Dependent variable 1: FDI by Investors with paired experience. 
Dependent variable 2 (the default): All other FDI. 
1996:1-1998:10 
FDI by Investors with paired experience (second and subsequent FDI) 
 Parameter 
i ii iii iv 
Lex  0.0130
c 
(0.0075) 
 -0.0091 (0.0131) 
)(sdexL    0.0471
a
(0.0182) 
0.0649b
(0.0293) 
Lsize  0.2628
a
(0.0204) 
0.2761a 
(0.0219) 
0.2790a 
(0.0214) 
0.2758a 
(0.0219) 
Domestic -0.8545
a
(0.0762) 
-0.9310a 
(0.0882) 
-0.9458a 
(0.0842) 
-0.9275a 
(0.0883) 
 
 
1996:1-2001:12 
FDI by Investors with paired experience (second and subsequent FDI) 
 Parameter 
v vi vii viii 
Lex  0.0310
a 
(0.0066) 
 -0.0001 (0.0120) 
)(sdexL    0.0911
a
(0.0162) 
0.0913a
(0.0293) 
cc -0.4882
a 
(0.0419) 
-0.6567a 
(0.0549) 
-0.6458a 
(0.0500) 
-0.6456a 
(0.0550) 
Lsize  0.3546
a 
(0.0128) 
0.3668a 
(0.0128) 
0.3664a 
(0.0127) 
0.3664a 
(0.0128) 
Domestic -0.9856
a 
(0.0514) 
-1.0661a 
(0.0540) 
-1.0604a 
(0.0529) 
-1.0603a 
(0.0540) 
 
Notes: Investors with paired experience refers to investor and host firm having FDI experience with each other 
prior to current FDI event. Lex= log of 3-month moving average of exchange rate (won per dollar) centered on 
preceding month; Volatility- = the log of the of 3-month moving average of standard deviation of the 
daily change in the won/dollar exchange rate each month centered on the preceding month; cc= index of capital 
control set at zero prior to 1998:11, and set at 1 after 1998:11; Lsize = the log of size of individual FDI; 
=1 if the FDI host is an unlisted domestic firm, and 0 otherwise;. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance level of at least 99%, 95%, and 90% or above, 
respectively. 
)(sdexL
Domestic
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Table 4B. Binomial Logit Regressions: Likelihood of FDI by Investors with Paired 
Experience Relative to that by Other Agents for Different Measures of Volatility: 1996:1-
1998:10 & 1996:1-2001:12 
Dependent variable 1: FDI by Investors with paired experience. 
Dependent variable 2 (the default): All other FDI. 
1996:1-1998:10 
FDI by Investors with paired experience (second and subsequent FDI) 
Volatility =  
)(garchL  Volatility =  (exp)V Volatility =  (max)V
Parameter 
i ii iii iv v vi 
Lex  -0.0161 (0.0185)  
0.0064 
(0.0082)  
0.0044 
(0.0086) 
Volatility 0.0303
b
(0.0133) 
0.0564c
(0.0327) 
0.1195a
(0.0453) 
0.1050b 
(0.0491) 
0.0804a
(0.0341) 
0.0721b
(0.0341) 
Lsize  0.2791
a 
(0.0217) 
0.2765a 
(0.0219) 
0.2718a 
(0.0207) 
0.2772a 
(0.0219) 
0.2737a 
(0.0219) 
0.2771a 
(0.0219) 
Domestic -0.9454
a 
(0.0862) 
-0.9289a 
(0.0883) 
-0.8892a 
(0.0783) 
-0.9310a 
(0.0883) 
-0.9110a 
(0.0794) 
-0.9309a 
(0.0883) 
 
1996:1-2001:12 
FDI by Investors with paired experience (second and subsequent FDI) 
Volatility =  
)(garchL  Volatility =  (exp)V Volatility =  (max)V
Parameter 
vii viii ix x xi xii 
Lex  -0.0100 (0.0156)  
0.0165b
(0.0078)  
0.0239a
(0.0074) 
Volatility 0.0631
a
(0.0115) 
0.0788a
(0.0273) 
0.1581a
(0.0287) 
0.1201a
(0.0340) 
0.1828a
(0.0506) 
0.1101b
(0.0506) 
cc -0.6559
a 
(0.0516) 
-0.6436a 
(0.0551) 
-0.5594a 
  (0.0436) 
-0.6321a 
  (0.0554) 
-0.4700a 
(0.0421) 
-0.6078a 
(0.0595) 
Lsize  0.3677
a 
(0.0128) 
0.3671a 
(0.0128) 
0.3632a 
(0.0127) 
0.3676a 
(0.0128) 
0.3597a 
(0.0126) 
0.3671a 
(0.0128) 
Domestic -1.0659
a 
(0.0533) 
-1.0602a 
(0.0540) 
-1.0336a 
(0.0521) 
-1.0644a 
(0.0540) 
-1.0157a 
(0.0519) 
-1.0657a 
(0.0540) 
Notes: Investors with paired experience refers to investor and host firm having FDI experience with each other 
prior to current FDI event. Lex= log of 3-month moving average of exchange rate (won per dollar) centered on 
preceding month; Volatility-  = log of 3-month moving average of monthly exchange rate volatility 
given by the conditional standard deviation generated by a GARCH process fitted to the exchange rate, 
centered on preceding month; =
)(garchL
(max)V }0,1300max{01.0 −ex  and by = , where ex  is 
3-month moving average won/dollar exchange rate; cc= index of capital control set at zero prior to 1998:11, 
and set at 1 after 1998:11; = the log of size of individual FDI; =1 if the FDI host is an unlisted 
domestic firm, and 0 otherwise;. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate 
significance level of at least 99%, 95%, and 90% or above, respectively. 
(exp)V }200/)1300{( −exe
Lsize Domestic
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